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Two Little Words and FTC Goes Local
John A. Maher, Jr.*
I. Introduction
As 1975 started, the ponderously titled "Magnuson-Moss War-
ranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act" became law.'
Accorded considerable acclaim, the enactment marked an end to long
persevering agitation for more particularized warranty regulation.
2
Popular attention tended to obscure "improvements" suggested in
the Act's title, i.e., the Federal Trade Commission improvements.
These "improvements" have the potency to involve practitioners
who rarely, if ever before, were concerned with FTC jurisprudence.
Practitioners in jurisdictions lacking comprehensive antitrust laws or
consumer-fraud schemes,3 or the will to enforce them, are well ad-
vised to consider the effect of the new act on their usual clientele. It
may prove that a substantial portion of the bar will learn that FTC
developments are too important to be left to antitrust and other prac-
titioners concerned with the Commission's more specialized activi-
ties.
Central to the likely emergence of FTC as a regulator of
local business activities is addition of the words "or affecting" to
the Commission's present jurisdictional charter, section 5(a) of the
Federal Trade Commission Act.4 These two little words expand
FTC's jurisdiction from activities "in commerce" to activities "in or
affecting commerce," unleashing the Commission on a host of previ-
ously untuochable activities-all "unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices which, although local in character, affect interstate commerce."
* Associate Professor, Dickinson School of Law. A.B. 1951, University of
Notre Dame; LL.B. 1956, LL.M. 1957, New York University.
1. Act of Jan. 4, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2193 [hereinafter referred
to as 1975 Act].
2. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2301-12 (Supp. 1976).
3. See note 25 infra.
4. 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(a)(1) (Supp. 1976).
5. H.R. REP. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reported in 4 U.S. CODE
CoNG. & AD. NEws 7702, 7726 (1974) (emphasis added).
This article seeks to alert general practioners to a new source
of trade regulation. Significance of the change in FTC jurisdiction
will be explained. Then, the general nature of activities over which
the Commission has exercised power will be discussed.
II. Jurisdictional Expansion of FTC
A. Definition of "In Commerce"-FTC's Old Jurisdiction
As enacted in 1914, section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act proscribed only "unfair methods of competition in commerce."'
An early decision restricted FTC to controlling those activities that
hindered competition.7 Desiring to give FTC the power to pro-
tect consumers as well as competitors, Congress added the phrase
"unfair or deceptive acts or practices" to section 5's ban on "unfair
methods of competition."8  Still, the focus on acts "in commerce"
was retained.
Commerce is a word of art defined to include commerce with
foreign nations, commerce in or otherwise involving the territories or
the District of Columbia, and commerce between nations, territories,
the District of Columbia, and the states, i.e., interstate commerce.9
As a consequence of statutory concentration on acts "in com-
merce," activities merely affecting interstate commerce were held to
be beyond the delegation of power to FTC although within Con-
gress' regulatory power.'°
The Supreme Court prophesied that giving FTC power over
activities affecting interstate commerce would "give a federal agen-
cy pervasive control over myriads of local ,businesses in matters
heretofore traditionally left to local custom or local law . . .,,
While the Court did not decry this amplification of Commission
power, it opined that such a sweeping change should emanate from
Congress and not the Court:
6. Act of Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719.
7. FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920).
8. Act of Mar. 21, 1938, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. 111.
9. 15 U.S.C. § 44 (1970).
10. FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349 (1941). Since 1941 the definition of "in
commerce" for purposes of the FTC Act has been broadened. Thus, unfair practices
by an intrastate retailer who resold goods received from an out-of-state resource
were held to be "in commerce." American News Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 104
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 824 (1962). An intrastate retailer was said to be "in
commerce" when it received goods from a warehouse located within the retailer's
state of operation because the warehouse received out-of-state deliveries. Holland
Furnace Co. v. FTC, 269 F.2d 203 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 928 (1960).
Recent Supreme Court decisions reaffirm the vitality of interstate commerce tests in
the context of § 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. H§ 14, 18 (1970)). United
States v. American Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422 U.S. 271 (1975); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp
Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186 (1974).
11. FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349, 354 (1941).
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The problem ... is very different from... the full scope of the
constitutional power of Congress under the Commerce Clause
... . This case presents the narrow question of what Congress
did, not what it could do. And we merely hold that to read 'un-
fair methods of competition in [interstate] commerce' as though
it means 'unfair methods of competition in any way affecting in-
terstate commerce', requires . . . much clearer manifestation
than Congress has furnished.
12
More than three decades later, Congress manifested this intent in
simple and direct fashion.
B. "Affecting Commerce"-FTC's New Jurisdiction
1. Changes by the 1975 Act.--Stripped to its essentials, title
II of the 1975 Act does five principal things. First, as already noted,
is expansion of the Commission's general jurisdiction from concern
with unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices "in commerce" to such transgressions "in or affecting com-
merce."'13 Its specialized jurisdiction over food, drug, and cosmetic
advertising is similarly enlarged. 4 Second, powers to exact reports
from, and otherwise investigate, corporations engaged in commerce
have been enlarged to embrace any "persons, partnerships, or corpo-
rations, engaged in and whose business affects commerce," excepting
only banks and Interstate Commerce Commission-regulated common
carriers.' 5 This has considerable pertinence in context of recent
FTC stress on "line-of-business reporting." FTC powers to require
documentary evidence and compel attendance of witnesses are simi-
larly expanded.' 6 Third, section 202 confirms Commission power to
promulgate substantive trade regulation rules and defines certain
12. Id. at 355 (emphasis added).
13. 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(a)(1) (Supp. 1976).
14. Id. § 52(b).
15. Id. § 46(b). Commission investigatory powers are contained in H§ 6 and
9 of the FTC Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 46, 49 (1970). Section 6 confers power on the
FTC to require "reports" from persons affecting commerce. 15 U.S.C.A. § 46(b)
(Supp. 1976). Prior to 1975, only "corporations engaged in commerce" were
subject to this power; now, any "persons, partnerships or corporations ... whose
business affects commerce" are subject to it. Id. This power can be exercised to
support § 5 proceedings, as well as for general surveys of economic activity. United
States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950). Limits on the Commission's author-
ity to conduct "mail-order investigations" lack precise definition:
Even if one were to regard the request for information .. . as caused by
nothing more than official curiosity, nevertheless law-enforcing agencies
have a legitimate right to satisfy themselves that corporate behavior is con-
sistent with the law and the public interest.
Id. at 652.
16. 15 U.S.C.A. § 49 (Supp. 1976).
procedural steps attendant upon their adoption. 17 Persons interested
in a proposed rule are entitled to an oral hearing in which, if the
Commission recognizes a dispute as to material fact, such persons
may cross-examine witnesses and submit rebuttals.' 8 Fourth, under
section 205 the Commission may sue for a civil penalty up to
$10,000 per day for each knowing violation of either a trade regula-
tion rule or a cease-and-desist order.' 9 Last, consumer redress for
violations of these rules or orders is available through suits to be
commenced at the discretion of FTC.2"
Belief that the expanded jurisdiction of FTC is the most
significant change under the 1975 Act does not belittle expanded
investigatory power, meaningful civil penalties, or relative certainty
as to power to promulgate legitimate trade regulations rules. But
17. Id. § 57a(a)-(b). Trade regulation rules are not new. See 4 TRADE REG.
REP. [ 38,011-43. Heretofore, their emphasis has been on merchandising meth-
ods, such as proper size labeling of sleeping bags, id. at 38,011, and table cloths,
id. at 38,015. Such rules were challenged on the basis that the FTC Act con-
tained neither authority nor standards for FTC to promulgate them. National
Pet. Ref'rs Ass'n v. FTC, 340 F. Supp. 1343 (D.D.C. 1972), rev'd, 482 F.2d 672
(D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974). By expressly providing that
the Commission has authority to make these rules, Congress moots this contro-
versy. Whether there will be a resurgence of judicial demand for well-defined stand-
ards of delegation is unknown. Currently, the sole standard is the Commission's
sense of unfairness to which the 'late Professor Cahn's Sense of Injustice may be as
good an index as any. E. CAI-N, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE (1949).
Those who remember the N.R.A., studied it, or read the "Chicken Case," A.L.A.
Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), can study the 1975
"improvements" to the FTC Act in the context of the FTC's evolving power to de-
fine what is unfair. Under the National Industrial Recovery Act the President was
authorized to promulgate Codes of Fair Competition for trades, industries, or sub-
divisions thereof. Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 90, § 3, 48 Stat. 195. Violation of a
Code was regarded as an unfair method of competition within the FTC Act and was
punishable by a fine up to $500. Each day of the violation was deemed a separate
offense. The Act failed to define "fair competition." Recognizing that the FTC Act
had provided for a case-by-case determination of what constituted "unfair methods of
competition," the Supreme Court nonetheless boggled at delegation of power to define
ab initio what would constitute fair competition: "mhe purpose is . . . to authorize
new and controlling prohibitions through codes . . . which would embrace what the
formulators would propose . . . as wise and beneficient measures for the government
of trades and industries in order to bring about their rehabilitation, correction and de-
velopment .... ." A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, supra at 535 (em-
phasis added). Since the Act did not "prescribe rules of conduct," but merely author-
ized "codes to prescribe them," the "code-making authority" was held to be "an un-
constitutional delegation of legislative power." Id. at 541-42.
It is difficult to perceive a substantial difference between the rulemaking power
now explicit in § 18 of the FTC Act and the President's power under N.I.R.A.
That rules issued under § 18 have the force of law is undoubted. Note that
the penalty structure of § 5(m) of the FTC Act looks to violation of "any rule."
15 U.S.C.A. § 45(m)(1)(A) (Supp. 1976). Of course, the "Chicken Case" dealt
with the propriety of convictions under the N.I.R.A., whereas the FTC Act does
not contemplate penal proceedings. On the other hand, a civil penalty of $10,000
for each day of knowing violation is not inconsiderable. Id.
18. 15 U.S.C.A. § 57a(c) (Supp. 1976).
19. Id. § 45(m).
20. Id. § 57b.
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it must be stressed that they exist to buttress the jurisdiction of FTC
and, in terms of importance, must be regarded as subordinate to it.
Honesty compels admitting a certain skepticism about consumer
redress litigation beyond meaningful consumer control. Those provi-
sions have all the earmarks of becoming little more than a tool with
which to coerce early submission of respondents. If this proves
correct, their actual use will be infrequent and must prove an irritant
to professional consumerists who inevitably will decry underutiliza-
tion.
2. The Meaning of "Affecting Commerce."--Section 5(a) of
the FTC Act now reads: "Unfair methods of competition in or
affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce, are declared unlawful."2  This is buttressed by
section 5(b):
Whenever the commission shall have reason to believe that any
. . . person. . . has been or is using any unfair method of com-
petition or unfair or deceptive act or practice in or affecting
commerce, and if it shall appear to the commission that a pro-
ceeding by it. . . would be to the interest of -the public, it shall
issue and serve. . . a complaint stating its charges. . . . The
person. . . so complained of shall have the right to appear...
and show cause why an order should not be entered... requir-
ing such person, . . . to cease and desist from the violation of
the law so charged . ... 22
Congressional intent in extending FTC jurisdiction is clear.
Remarking H.R. 7917, a precursor of the 1975 Act, the Interstate
& Foreign Commerce Committee observed in June 1974,
It is unrealistic to restrict the jurisdiction of the FTC under sec-
tion 5 of the Act to only interstate transactions. Although al-
most all economic activity today has interstate effects, it is possi-
ble . . . for a persistent, inventive and determined law violator
to cast his business in the form of a series of intrastate steps,
with only incidental interstate transactions. 23
The committee found that
existing jurisdiction of the FTC. . . is much narrower than the
scope of the 'commerce clause' of the Constitution. Conse-
quently many unfair or deceptive acts or practices which affect
commerce are now either beyond reach of the Commission or re-
21. Id. § 45(a)(1) (emphasis added).
22. Id. § 45(b) (emphasis added).
23. H.R. REP. No. 1107, supra note 5, at 7713.
quire an inordinate expenditure of time and effort to marshal
evidence to satisfy purely jurisdictional technicalities. Many
frauds occur in large cities where concentrations of the poor and
the poorly educated make them easy targets for dishonest opera-
tors. . . largely beyond the Commission's reach.
24
The committee recommended "placing within [FTC's] reach
unfair or deceptive acts or practices which, although local in
character, affect interstate commerce"25  because granting this
jurisdiction would reflect "both the structure of the modern
American economy and the current Constitutional concept of the
proper scope of the Federal Government's authority to regulate the
economy."2 6  Since the committee had noted the courts' recog-
nition of "Congress' power to include authority over ostensibly
intrastate transactions which significantly affect interstate com-
merce,"2 7 it is virtually mandatory to infer that the "proper scope"
usage was intended to convey a grant of maximum power under the
commerce clause.2 8 This effect has already been recognized by the
Supreme Court, albeit by way of an aside.
2 9
Fortunately, there is precedent that assists in grasping the
"affecting commerce" concept. Since FTC deals with anti-
trust as well as consumer deception, the most useful precedents
concern the reach of the Sherman Act."° The Sherman Act does not
speak explicitly to methods or practices "affecting commerce," but to
activities recognized by their effect on commerce, i.e., activities that
restrain it."1 Nevertheless, it is well settled that the Sherman Act
embraces all activities that affect interstate commerce.3 2
Under the Sherman Act a local newspaper's use of wire services
and newsprint from out-of-state sources involved the newspaper in
interstate commerce 3 3  California beet-sugar refiners were prose-
cuted for an intrastate price-fixing conspiracy on the theory that
sugar made from the beets would eventually pass into interstate
24. Id. at 7726.
25. Id. (emphasis added). The committee added a caveat: "Where cases of
consumer fraud of a local nature which affect commerce are being effectively dealt
with by State or local government agencies, it is the Committee's intent that the.
Commission should not intrude." Id.
26. Id. at 7713 (emphasis added).
27. Id. at 7712 (emphasis added).
28. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8.
29. United States v. American Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 277 n.6
(1975).
30. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
31. Id. §§ 1-2.
32. Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320, 321 (1967); United States v. Employing Plas-
terers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186, 189 (1954); Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American
Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 232 (1948).
33. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
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commerce.3 4  The impact on commerce need not be as obvious as a
product leaving the state or materials entering it. In Burke v. Ford3"
intrastate territorial division by liquor wholesalers was held to have
"inevitably affected" interstate commerce;3 6 without hearing argu-
ment, the Supreme Court devised a theory that higher prices and
lower sales would follow successful market allocation, in which event
procurements from out-of-state distillers would decline. 7 The true
flavor of the requisite effect upon interstate commerce can be
savored by reference to United States v. Pennsylvania Refuse Remov-
al Association,8 in which jurisdiction over Pennsylvania refuse col-
lectors was retained because some Pennsylvania refuse was carted to
New Jersey for disposition.
Cases such as Burke v. Ford9 suggest that lower courts will not
resist prophylactic stretches of the commerce power to reach species
of conduct already recognized as antisocial to the extent such prac-
tices can affect interstate commerce to any appreciable degree. While
the current Supreme Court can be expected to use restraint
in defining "affecting commerce,"40 it should be noted that Congress
easily could have provided that -the Commission's jurisdiction would
cover matters "in or significantly affecting comerce" if a limitation
other than constitutional was intended. The legislative history, how-
ever, indicates otherwise.41
References to Sherman Act jurisprudence are instructive but not
necessarily exhaustive. Perhaps, looking to the future, reference to
more specialized fields is useful. The basic prohibition of section 5
of the Securities Act of 1933 proscribes use of "any means or instru-
ments of . . .communication in interstate commerce" to promote
unregistered securities.42 Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act
34. Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S.
219, 229-34 (1948).
35. 389 U.S. 320 (1967).
36. Id. at 322.
37. Id.
38. 242 F. Supp. 794 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
39. See notes 35-37 and accompanying text supra.
40. An example of the Court's restraint is found in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp
Paving Co., Inc., 419 U.S. 186 (1974). In considering whether to liberalize Clayton
Act jurisdictional standards to bring them in conformance with the Sherman Act, the
Court held that substantial effects on commerce cannot be presumed. "Plaintiff must
allege and prove that apparently local acts in fact have adverse consequences on in-
terstate markets and the interstate flow of goods ....... Id. at 202.
41. See notes 23-27 and accompanying text supra.
42. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (1) (1970) (emphasis added).
of 1934 proscribes uses "of any means or instrumentality of inter-
state commerce" for untoward purposes.4 3 Interstate telephone calls
will suffice to obtain jurisdiction." To the best of the writer's
knowledge, the Securities & Exchange Commission has not asserted
that intrastate telephone calls are such a use. Yet, at the instance
of private suitors, there has been a trend to regard intrastate calls,
using facilities that are in fact interstate, as providing the jurisdic-
tional nexus for complaints brought under federal securities laws.45
Note that, as to interstate calls, there is no statutory requirement for
either substantial use of interstate communications facilities or their
use in a manner essential to the transaction under scrutiny.46 So,
too, it would seem with intrastate calls employing de facto interstate
facilities. If such a broad jurisdictional nexus is applied in enforcing
the securities acts, we cannot presume that courts will require that
commerce be significantly or substantially affected to confer jurisdic-
tion on FTC under the 1975 Act.
Renewed attention to the "public interest" requirement in sec-
tion 5(b) of the FTC Act4 7 may be respondents' route to compelling
attention to the significance, in terms of societal values, of challenged
practices. Section 5(b) states that the Commission may issue a
complaint if it "appear[s] to the Commission that a proceeding . . .
would be to the interest of the public."'4 8  This requirement has
proved to be variously an annoyance49 and an escape hatch"0 to the
Commission. Its importance as an item of defense was downgraded
as courts became less rigorous about a clear-cut showing of public
interest. For example, addressing deceptive practices, the Second
Circuit provided a minimizing formulation:
[E]xistence of a public interest ...may rest either on the
deception suffered by the public . . . or the prejudice occa-
sioned to competitors.... On either ground the public is enti-
tled to be protected against unfair practices and its interest in
43. Id. § 78j (emphasis added).
44. Starck v. Dewane, 364 F. Supp. 466, 469 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Rochez Bros.,
Inc. v. Rhoades, 353 F. Supp. 795, 806 (W.D. Pa.), vacated on other grounds, 491
F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1973).
45. Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967); Ingraffia v. Belle Meade
Hosp., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 537 (E.D. La. 1970); Nemitz v. Cunny, 221 F. Supp. 571
(N.D. Ill. 1963). But see Rosen v. Albem Color Research, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 473
(E.D. Pa. 1963). Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., Inc., 419 U.S. 186 (1974),
should also be considered. In that case the Supreme Court resisted plaintiff's argu-
ment that paving work on a local (intrastate) portion of an interstate highway was
sufficient involvement with an instrumentality of interstate commerce to warrant pro-
ceeding under the Clayton Act's "in commerce" standard.
46. See note 44 supra.
47. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
48. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1970).
49. FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 28 (1929).
50. In re Motorola, Inc., 64 F.T.C. 62 (1964); In re Atlantic Prods. Corp.,




such protection is specific and substantial. . . . Nor is it neces-
sary that the product misrepresented be inferior or harmful to
the public. The deceptive misrepresentation sufficesA1
Despite such invitation to FTC boot-strapping, respondents' counsel
should continue to be alert to "public interest" implications in the
event that the Commission, desirous in the dim and uncertain future
of multitudinous pelts with which to impress front-line consumerists
and/or appropriations subcommittees, should display arbitrariness in
addressing practices supposedly affecting commerce. Will the courts
refuse to entertain a challenge to proceedings evincing lack of "con-
science and circumspection in prosecuting officers?" 52 Surely, if the
Commission simultaneously addresses a peculiarly local activity and
attempts to make prosecutorial breakthroughs on what is to be
deemed "unfair," argument should be made that FTC has an
affirmative obligation to substantiate that the proceeding is indeed "to
the interest of the public."
3. Practicalities of FTC's Assumption of its Expanded Juris-
diction.-While there is a serious potential for imposition of changes
on local trading patterns, it is impossible to estimate the rate
at which such changes will be sought, let alone achieved. Powerful
personages are reported to have needled FTC to something sub-
stantially greater than glacial change.53 On the other hand, there
is often a vast gap between obtaining jurisdiction and exercising it.
Even assuming an institutional desire to maximize its new found
jurisdiction (which the writer does not) the Commission has logistic
restraints in common with every other agency.
Appropriations, obviously, are basic. It is at least unwise to
assume that they will expand at a rate commensurate with newly
assigned responsibilities. Even if they did, the Commission would
have the burden of identifying, marshaling, and deploying human
and material resources appropriate to the task. As of September 15,
51. FTC v. Real Prods. Corp., 90 F.2d 617, 619 (2d Cir. 1937) (citations
omitted).
52. Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 378 (1913).
53. It has been reported that
[tjhe Senate Commerce Committee has asked the. .. Commission to begin
...semi-annual reports to the Committee on the agency's use of ...new
enforcement tools. . . . Chairman Warren G. Magnuson . . . and .. .
Subcommittee Chairman Frank E. Moss. . .want.. . the FTC to report
on . . . activities resulting from the 'affecting commerce' jurisdictional
standard of the newly enacted 'FTC Improvements Act,' . . FTC would
be called for oversight hearings in early 1976.
699 BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. A-33 (Feb. 4, 1975).
1975, the commission had 1,546 employees of which only 420 were
assigned to field offices. Its fiscal year 1975 appropriation was
$38,983,000 and it was seeking $45,927,000 for the current fiscal
year.514 The writer believes, based on discussions with Commission
personnel, that FTC employed 1,200 persons as of the end of fiscal
year 1966.15 Thus, during ten years in which it was severely
criticized56 and a reinvigoration proclaimed, Commission employees
increased by only 350. Although a 28.83% increase, this accretion
seems a drop in the jurisdictional bucket for an agency so in the pub-
lic eye.1
7
Whether FTC will or should be better favored in light of its
new responsibility is beyond the scope of this effort. One must
assume that Commission staff will not be blind to local situations to
which it may extend its de facto writ, with an eye not only to the
public good, but also to the collection of trophies for display before
appropriations subcommittees. Indeed, Commission personnel would
be less than human if they failed to react to such pressures. 8
III. FTC's Targets-Proscribed Activities
Having recognized that FTC now has jurisdiction over a consid-
erable span of local activities, one must ask: "What sorts of activi-
ties?" Substantively section 5(a) of the FTC Act proscribes "unfair
methods of competition" and "unfair or deceptive acts or practices." 59
For some time, it has been fashionable to consider "unfair or decep-
tive acts or practices" separately from "unfair methods of competi-
tion." There was logic, both historical and philosophical, in this, but
as later discussion suggests, recent decisions make this question-
able.60
"Unfair methods of competition" and "unfair or deceptive acts
or practices" describe classes of conduct. Congress, however,
"deemed it better to leave the subject without precise definition, and
to have each case determined upon its own facts, owing to the
54. Letter from James A. Williams, Chief of the FTC Division of Budget &
Finance, to John A. Maher, Jr., Sept. 15, 1975.
55. Address by John A. Maher, Jr., N.Y. State Bar Ass'n You and Antitrust
Forum, Buffalo, N.Y., Nov. 5, 1966.
56. "Problems of delay have rvexed the FTC ever since it was established, and
some of the most notorious examples of protracted administrative proceedings have
occurred in that agency." ABA, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE To STUDY THE F.T.C.
(Sept. 15, 1969).
57. In addition to the FTC Act, the Commission actively bears responsibility
for the Fur Products Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. § 69 (1970), the Textile Fibers Iden-
tification Act, id. § 70, and the Wood Products Labeling Act, id. § 68. Less consum-
ing are its responsibilities under the Webb-Pomerene Act, id. §§ 61-65 and the Lan-
ham Act, id. § 1064.
58. See note 53 supra for a source of such pressure.
59. 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a)-(b) (1970).
60. See notes 140-43 and accompanying text infra.
FTC Goes Local
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
multifarious means by which it is sought to effectuate such
schemes."'61 Initially the Supreme Court limited "unfair methods of
competition" to violations of existing law.62 Later it was "recognized
. that the Commission [had] broad powers to declare trade
practices unfair."63  Thus, one cannot mark out sharp and clear
limits as to what, in an evolving FTC catalog of sins, may prove to be
"unfair." While the language of the Act is almost unlimited in scope,
the Commission has not yet made a habit of using section 5 "as a
basis for bizarre doctrinal experimentation." 4  There have been
charges, however, that undesirable overreaches have occurred. 65
A. "Unfair Methods of Competition"
Proscription of "unfair methods of competition" includes re-
straints of trade addressed generally by the Sherman Act and particu-
larly by the Clayton Act.66 The Clayton Act explicitly provides a
role for FTC; the Sherman Act does not. Nevertheless, it is now
undoubted that price-fixing, 67 group boycotts,6 and the array of
Sherman Act sins unmentioned by the Clayton Act are "unfair meth-
ods of competition" within the ambit of section 5 of the FTC Act.
1. Evolving Definition: Antitrust by Analogy; Antitrust of In-
cipiency; Spirit of Antitrust.-Even when technical limitations ex-
plicit or implicit in antitrust statutes preclude their application to
certain persons or transactions, the activities in question may be
addressed by FTC under section 5(a). Thus, although the merger
and acquisition strictures of section 7 of the Clayton Act focus on
corporations," the Commission has applied them to unincorporated
associations. 70 Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act,71 which embodies
the principal thrust of the Robinson-Patman Act against price dis-
crimination in sales, has been applied by analogy to discriminatory
equipment rental. 72 Section 2(d) of Robinson-Patman prohibits sell-
61. FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 453 (1922).
62. FI'C v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 427 (1920).
63. FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., Inc., 384 U.S. 316, 320-21 (1966).
64. Howery, Utilization by the F.T.C. of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act As An Antitrust Law, 5 AN=rrUST BULL. 161, 178 (1960).
65. See, e.g., Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments-1966, 21 RECoRD OF
N.Y.C.B.A. 539, 544 (1966).
66. Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
67. FTC v. Pacific States Paper Trade Ass'n, 273 U.S. 52 (1927).
68. Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
69. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
70. Beatrice Foods Co., [1965-1966 Transfer Binder] TRADE REC. REP. 17,244
(FTC 1965).
71. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970).
72. LaPeyre v. FTC, 366 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1966).
ers from affording certain merchandising supports to buyers, but does
not prohibit buyers from soliciting or receiving such support;73 sec-
tion 5 of the FTC Act 74 has been successfully deployed against such
buyers.75 The catalog can be prolonged. Section 3 of the Clayton Act
forbids exclusive dealing arrangements imposed by sellers or lessors
on buyers or lessees. 76  It does not address similar arrangements
imposed by principals upon agents or buyers on sellers; section 5 fills
this void.77
Embracing such matters within "unfair methods of competition"
may not shock the social conscience. But, taken individually or
collectively, they present a real question as to how far FTC can go
in applying what it conceives to be the spirit of the antitrust laws. Is
unsuccessful solicitation of discriminatory pricing or disproportionate
merchandising support prohibited by section 5 of the FTC Act,
although unreached by Robinson-Patman? Since discriminatory
equipment rentals fall under section 5,78 can Congress' omission of
the sale of services from Robinson-Patman be similarly "cured"? Can
section 5 be used against the interlocking directorate of competing
corporations that lack the $1,000,000 "capital, surplus and undivided
profits" contemplated by section 8 of the Clayton Act?
79
In an early case FTC specifically alleged that the Curtis Pub-
lishing Company had violated section 5 of the FTC Act and section
3 of the Clayton Act.80 The company had entered into exclusive
wholesaling contracts with numerous agents and required them not
to distribute for other publishers. Concluding that the contracts had
created an agency relationship and, thus, were technically not within
section 3,1 l the Supreme Court said that there was no violation of
section 5 since there was no showing that Curtis "intended to prac-
tice unfair methods, or unduly suppress competition, or to acquire
monopoly. '82 Of significance is that the Court did not feel impelled
73. 15 U.S.C. § 13(d) (1970).
74. Id. § 45(a) (Supp. 1976).
75. American News Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 104 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
824 (1962); Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962). The signifi-
cance of using the FTC Act to prohibit buyers from soliciting or receiving merchandis-
ing support is that Congress did prohibit knowing receipt of price discrimination, 15
U.S.C. § 13(f) (1970), and could easily have embraced discriminatory merchandising
supports in the ban if it so chose.
76. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970).
77. FTC v. Motion Picture Adv. Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 395 (1953).
78. LaPeyre v. FTC, 366 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1966).
79. 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1970).
80. FTC v. Curtis Publ. Co., 260 U.S. 568 (1923).
81. For there to be a violation of § 3, there must be a sale or lease. 15 U.S.C.
§ 14 (1970). In an agency contract there is no sale or lease, rather the owner con-
signs his product to the agent and retains title until it is sold. FTC v. Curtis Publ.
Co., 260 U.S. 568, 581-82 (1923).
82. 260 U.S. at 581 (emphasis added).
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to object to characterizing misuse of agency contracts as violative of
section 5 if the aforesaid intent had been proven. Contemporane-
ously, in FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co. 83 the Supreme Court con-
sidered section 3 and section 5 counts separately although they com-
plained of essentially the same thing. The message drawn from
these cases is that even the "conservative" court of McReynolds &
Company could accept section 5 as a vehicle for proscribing practices
that would fall within section 3 of the Clayton Act but for technical
deficiency.
The Fashion Originators' Guild decision,"4 often cited for the
proposition that the Sherman Act proscribes group boycotts, was a
section 5 case. Sustaining a Commission order to cease boycotting
retailers who countenanced style piracy, the Supreme Court said,
the "[C]ommission concluded in the language of the Clayton
Act that these understandings substantially lessened competition and
tended to create a monopoly. . . . [T]he Commission, upon ade-
quate and unchallenged findings, correctly concluded that this prac-
tice constitutes an unfair method of competition." 85 In other words,
the Court ruled that a group boycott, which violates the Sherman Act
because it substantially lessens competition and tends to create a mo-
nopoly, is also an "unfair method of competition" that can be prohib-
ited by FTC under section 5.
Not only may FTC attack practices that actually violate the
Sherman and Clayton Acts, but it may also challenge practices that
have the potential to violate them. This aspect of FTC's power may
be termed antitrust of incipiency. The first Raladam case88 explains
that
[t]he Clayton Act, so far as it deals with the subject, was
intended to reach in their incipiency agreements embraced
within the sphere of the Sherman Act. . . . The object of the
Trade Commission Act was to stop in their incipiency those
methods of competition which fall within the meaning of the
word 'unfair'. 'The great purpose of both statutes was to ad-
vance the public interest by securing fair opportunity for the
play of the contending forces ordinarily engendered by an honest
desire for gain'. . . . All three statutes seek to protect the pub-
lic from abuses arising in the course of competitive interstate and
foreign trade. In a case arising under the Trade Commission
83. 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
84. Fashion Originators' Guild v. FrC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
85. Id. at 464.
86. FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931).
Act, the fundamental questions are, whether the methods com-
plained of are 'unfair' . . . .87
In FTC v. Cement Institute,"8 one of the principal books of the
FTC Bible, the Commission attacked a multiple basing point pricing
system under section 5, alleging it resulted in quotation of identical
sale and price terms for cement at any given point in the United
States, and under section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, alleging it resulted
in systematic price discrimination among customers of each cement
marketer-member of the institute. After rebuffing a jurisdictional
attack grounded on a theory that only the Justice Department could
prosecute violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, the Supreme
Court remarked that the Trade Commission was established "to hit
at every trade practice, then existing or thereafter contrived, which
restrains competition or might lead to such restraint if not stopped
in its incipient stages. '"89 Although the Commission had charged an
actual, rather than an incipient price fixing conspiracy and proved
actual agreement, Mr. Justice Black reiterated that a "major purpose"
of the FTC Act was
to enable the Commission to restrain practices as 'unfair' which,
although not yet having grown into Sherman Act dimensions
would, most likely do so if left unrestrained ...
• * * [T]he basic problem is whether the Commission made
findings of concerted action, whether those findings are sup-
ported by evidence, and if so whether the findings are adequate
as a matter of law to sustain the Commission's conclusion that
the multiple basing point system as practiced constitutes an 'un-
fair method of competition,' because it either restrains free com-
petition or is an incipient menace to it.90
In 1953 FTC attacked the Motion Picture Advertising Serv-
ice Company's arrangement with various theatre owners around the
country for display of advertising films." By contract with the
company, a theatre owner undertook to limit his display of commer-
cial advertising films to those furnished by the company. In the
twenty-seven states in which it operated, the company allegedly had
exclusive contracts with about forty percent of the theatres. Al-
though a "standard contract" was for one year, many ran for terms
up to five years. Four nonrelated organizations in the same business
had exclusive arrangements with approximately seventy-five percent
of these theatres showing such films. Finding that such exclusive
contracts limited outlets for films of competitors and had forced some
competitors out of business because of inability to obtain outlets, the
87. Id. at 647 (emphasis added).
88. 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
89. Id. at 693 (emphasis added).
90. Id. at 708-09 (emphasis added).
91. FTC v. Motion Picture Adv. Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953).
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Commission held that such contracts unduly restrict competition
when they extend for periods in excess of one year. Saying that the
vice of exclusive contracts was their tendency to restrain competition
and develop a monopoly in violation of the Sherman Act, the Su-
preme Court reversed a fairly technical court of appeals decision that
proceeded on the theory that the contracts in question were agency
contracts and thereby governed by the Curtis rationale. 2  Regretta-
bly, Justice Douglas confined himself to what has become a usual
incantation: the Trade Commission Act was "designed to supplement
and bolster the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act. . .to stop in their
incipiency acts and practices which, when full blown, would violate
those Acts, . . . as well as to condemn as 'unfair methods of com-
petition' existing violations of them. '93 The Court observed that it was
plain from the Commission's findings that a device which has
sewed up a market so tightly for the benefit of a few falls within
the prohibitions of the Sherman Act and is therefore 'an unfair
method of competition' within the meaning of § 5(a) of the
Federal Trade Commission Act.
94
The Second Circuit has been in the vanguard of the evolving
FTC jurisprudence. In 1962 it decided that section 5 would permit
orders against buyers' inducing and receiving "disproportionate"
promotional allowances from suppliers.9 5 An advertising firm owned
and operated an animated advertising sign in New York City's
Times Square. Under an agreement with the advertising firm,
Grand Union Grocery solicited fifteen of its suppliers to contract with
the advertising firm. Each supplier paid $1,000 per month for one
minute of each twenty minutes the animations operated. In return,
Grand Union got the benefit of the nonsubscribed time and later ar-
ranged to get five percent of the fees paid by the initial advertisers
92. See notes 80-82 and accompanying text supra.
93. 344 U.S. at 394 (emphasis added).
94. Id. at 395. While his dissent did not differ as to the ambit of § 5(a), Jus-
tice Frankfurter strongly complained that the majority's analogy to the Sherman Act
was inapplicable, since no conspiracy or concerted action to foreclose a market
had been relied upon by the Commission. He maintained that the Commission had
done no more than to express a legal conclusion that the questioned contracts consti-
tuted unfair methods of competition. He called upon the Commission not only to
abstain from pronouncing conclusions "by way of fiat and without explication," but
also to provide "some minimum demonstration to the courts that .. . [the] applica-
tion is in the public interest" since "even if the Commission had afforded reasons
why the law of unfair methods of competition should strike down exclusive con-
tracts," it should provide "[a]t the least . . adequate explanation of the reasons why
public interest requires its intervention and. . . order." Id. at 401, 403-04.
95. Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962).
plus all rentals from selling the balance of the twenty minutes. None
of the advertisers knew that Grand Union received these benefits as a
result of their participation in the advertising. The Commission
charged Grand Union with "unfair methods of competition" under
section 5 of the FTC Act, alleging it had "knowingly [induced] . . .
special payments and benefits from suppliers which were not made
available on proportionately equal terms to [its] competitors."9 6 Sec-
tions 2(d) and (e) of the Robinson-Patman Act9 7 prohibit sellers
from granting discriminations to purchasers under the guise of pay-
ments for advertising and promotional services. Neither section
2(c) nor 2(f), which are directed against buyers, deals with promo-
tional benefits. Grand Union maintained that since Congress had
not seen fit to include buyers within the prohibitions of section 2(d)
and (e), the Commission lacked power under section 5 to fill this
gap. The Second Circuit reasoned, however, that the omissions were
"more 'inadvertant' than 'studious,' "holding
[tlhe practices themselves, however, were declared contrary to
the public interest and therefore unlawful. Since, in the case of
§ 2(d) violations, there could be no unlawful preference made
by a seller unless it was received by a buyer, it is clear that
Congress did not intend to sanction buyers to continue to engage
in the unlawful activity.
98
The court dismissed those who might argue that Congress consciously
omitted buyers from sections 2(d) and (e) as engaging in "meta-
physical subtleties."99  Noting that section 2(d) defines a per se of-
fense, the court stated,
There is no reason why this rule should not apply to the buyer as
well as to the seller. Congress has made no such distinction; §
2(f), being the corollary of § 2(a), requires proof of injury to
competition in cases brought against buyers while § 2(c) ap-
plies a per se rule to buyers as well as sellers. . . . Since § 5 is
here utilized to reach an integral part of the violation of § 2(d),
and the rationale of the proceedings is to fulfill the policies of
that prohibition, it would seem an unwarranted amendment of
the legislative scheme to apply a different standard on -the ques-
96. Id. at 94.
97. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(d)-(e) (1970).
98. 300 F.2d at 97 (emphasis added).
Certainly buyers were not left out because Congress favored them or wished
to permit them to engage in activity proscribed to sellers. The Robinson-
Patman Act was enacted . .. following an investigation of large chain-
store buyers, to 'curb and prohibit all devices by which large buyers gained
discriminatory preferences over small ones by virtue of their greater pur-
chasing power'. . . . The Act outlaws several specific practices connected
with the sale of commodities which had been utilized by large buyers to
secure from their suppliers preferences not generally available .... De-
spite the evident purpose of the Act, and for reasons not apparent in the
Congressional history, many of these practices were made specifically unlaw-
ful for only one of the participants in the underlying economic transaction.
Id. at 96-97.
99. Id. at 99.
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tion of the competitive effects to the buyer than it applies to the
seller.' 00
Judge Moore's wonderful dissent contained these memorable words:
Unable to charge (much less prove) a violation of 2(a), 2(d)
or 2(f) and unable to avoid the inexorable mathematical law
that three zeros still total zero, the Commission precipitately
abandons the Clayton Act which had so generously contributed
its language (but not its blessing) to the complaint and by force
majeure seeks the protection of its natal act, alleging that Grand
Union is guilty of 'unfair methods of competition, and unfair acts
and practices in commerce, in violation of Section 5 . . . .' Hav-
ing just cast off sections 2(d) and (f), the Commission quickly
returns to them to turn (by some alchemic process) these two
paragraphs, not violated. . . into a violation of section 5.101
Despite failure in the philosophic realm, alchemy appears to have
triumphed over metaphysics.
In American News Co. v. FTC"°2 the Second Circuit reaffirmed
the reasoning of Grand Union, finding that a retail newstand operator
had violated section 5 of the FTC Act by demanding rebates from
publishers. The interesting twist in this case was that the retailer
purchased its magazines from distributors. While receiving benefit
from rebating publishers, technically the retailer was the distributors'
customer and not the publishers'. Nevertheless, the court held that
the retailer was a customer of the publishers for purposes of Section 5
analysis. 1 3 In both Grand Union and American News the Commis-
sion's order was directed against knowing inducement and receipt
of disproportionate payments. Within the year, another circuit
joined the camp.'0 4
Dealing variously with applicability of section 5 to violation
of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, incipient violation of them, and,
finally, violation of their spirit, these decisions set the stage for Brown
Shoe II10 and S&H. 10 6
2. Antitrust of Incipiency Triumphant-Brown Shoe 1.-The
essential facts of Brown Shoe10 7 are simple. Some 659 dealers were
involved in the "Brown Franchise Stores' Program." Of these, only
100. Id.
101. Id. at 102.
102. 300 F.2d 104 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 824 (1962).
103. Id. at 109.
104. Giant Food Inc. v. FTC, 307 F.2d 184 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
105. FIC v. Brown Shoe Co., Inc., 384 U.S. 316 (1966).
106. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
107. FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., Inc., 384 U.S. 316 (1966).
259 entered written franchise agreements. According to this stan-
dardized agreement, Brown was obligated to provide various services,
such as sales training, architectural plans, merchandising record sys-
tems, and group insurance at a discounted rate to participating deal-
ers. In return, the dealers were to refrain from purchasing lines con-
flicting with Brown's. An FTC trial examiner found that franchised
stores tended to purchase about seventy-five percent of their require-
ments from Brown, with the balance coming largely from noncom-
peting lines; that Brown "field men" checked up on franchised deal-
ers; and that Brown would cancel those who persisted in deviating
from the desired concentration. The dealers could withdraw from
the franchise program.
The examiner characterized the program as an exclusive dealing
arrangement that foreclosed Brown's competitors from selling to a
substantial number of shoe retailers. Striking the examiner's charac-
terization, the Commission substituted its own view that the program
was "akin to the operation of tying clauses generally held as inherent-
ly anti-competitive."' 1 8 The Commission held it unnecessary to
examine the probable effect upon competition to find the program an
unfair trade practice because the "prospective competitive impact...
is such that the standards of illegality under Section 3 and Section 7 of
the Clayton Act .. .have been met."'1 9 Noting that Brown had
6,000 retailer customers including the 650-odd program participants,
but lacked dominating power over either the "tying" services or the
"tied" product, the Eighth Circuit reversed the Commission.'" Since
dominance was absent, the court of appeals could not find any com-
parability with Northern Pacific"' or other classic "tying" decisions
cited by the Commission."' The court quoted from Northern Pacific:
"Of course where the seller has no control or dominance over the
tying product . . .any restraint of trade attributable to such tying
arrangement would obviously be insignificant at most.""' 3
By a unanimous vote, however, the Supreme Court reversed the
Eighth Circuit."' Without mentioning "tying" or citing the cases
with which the Commission had justified its position, Mr. Justice
Black nicely reduced the question to
whether the Federal Trade Commission can declare it to be an
unfair practice for Brown, the second largest manufacturer of
shoes in the nation, to pay a valuable consideration to hundreds
of retail shoe purchasers in order to secure a contractual promise
108. Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 45, 50 (8th Cir. 1964).
109. Id. (emphasis added).
110. Id. at 53-54.
111. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
112. 339 F.2d at 54-55.
113. Id. at 54.




S.. [to] ... deal primarily with Brown and... not purchase
conflicting lines of shoes .... 115
He answered affirmatively: "Ilhe Commission has power to find
: * . such an anticompetitive practice unfair, subject of course to
judicial review." 116 Presumably for our guidance, the Justice went on
to say that the Commission has broad powers to condemn those
trade practices which conflict with the basic policies of the Sher-
man and Clayton Acts even though such practices may not ac-
tually violate these laws. . . . [The Brown] program obvi-
ously conflicts with the central policy of both § 1 of the Sherman
Act and § 3 of the Clayton Act against contracts which take
away freedom of purchasers to buy in an open market. Brown
nevertheless contends that the Commission had no power to de-
clare the franchise program unfair without proof that its effect
'may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly' which of course would have to be proved if the gov-
ernment were proceeding against Brown under § 3 of the Clay-
ton Act rather than § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
We reject the argument that proof of this § 3 element must be
made for . . .our cases hold that the Commission has power
under § 5 to arrest trade restraints in their incipiency without
proof that they amount to an outright violation of § 3 of the
Clayton Act or other provisions of the antitrust laws."1
7
The purpose of section 3 of the Clayton Act was to restrain
specific practices that, otherwise unchecked, would tend to violate
the Sherman Act."1 Therefore, Brown Shoe leaves certain anomalies,
both rhetorical and legal. First, if the Clayton Act's proscription
against certain tying and exclusive dealing arrangements addressed
incipient violations of the Sherman Act, we have the spectre of the
FTC Act addressing incipient incipiencies." 9 Second, although con-
demnation of actual tying and exclusive dealing under section 3 of the
Clayton Act requires a showing of reasonably probable adverse com-
petitive effect, 2 ' proceedings against lesser but supposedly related
practices under section 5 of the FTC Act do not.
115. Id. at 320.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 321-22 (emphasis added).
118. FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 647-48 (1931).
119. Address by John A. Maher, Jr., N.Y. State Bar Ass'n You and Antitrust
Forum, Buffalo, N.Y., Nov. 5, 1966. When the author first mentioned this concept in
1966, Robert Longman of the New York bar suggested that the next step, which he
would be pleased to have known as the Longman Rule, would be to address practices
in their incipiency that, if full blown, would violate § 5. Thus, there would be three
levels of incipiency. He may have been prophetic. See notes 127-44 and ac-
companying text infra.
120. Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrame-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346 (1922).
To better understand Brown Shoe, it is helpful to look back
fifty-five years to the first Supreme Court decision dealing with
section 5.121 Fortuitously, it dealt with tying in that respondent
Gratz, a manufacturer of bagging and ties used in baling cotton,
refused to sell one without the other. Speaking for six of a seven-
man majority, Mr. Justice McReynolds held that it was for the courts,
not the Commission, to determine as a matter of law what the words
"unfair method of competition" include. Further, he stated that
they are clearly inapplicable to practices never heretofore re-
garded as opposed to good morals because characterized by de-
ception, bad faith, fraud, or oppression, or as against public pol-
icy because of their dangerous tendency unduly to hinder com-
petition or create monopoly. 12
2
So saying, he characterized the "tying" in question as "certainly not
intended to fetter free and fair competition as commonly understood
and practiced by honorable opponents in trade. 128
In Brown Shoe Mr. Justice Black made what has become a
standard reference to the strong dissent by Mr. Justice Brandeis in the
Gratz decision, stating that "it is now recognized in line with the
dissent of Mr. Justice Brandeis . . .that the Commission has broad
powers to declare trade practices unfair. 124 It is worthwhile to
examine the ,Brandeis dissent. FTC power was analogized to Inter-
state Commerce Commission power to prohibit "unjust and unreason-
able charges" and "undue or unreasonable preference or advantage."
Noting that the FTC Act addressed prevention of unfair methods, as
opposed to mere acts of unfair competition, Justice Brandeis scored
the majority for its failure to understand the congressional intent "to
prevent any unfair method which may have been used by any concern
in competition from becoming its general practice . . . . [since] only
by stopping its use before it became a general practice . . . [could]
, * . the apprehended effect of an unfair method in suppressing
competition . . . be averted."'1 25  It is questionable whether Mr.
Justice Black fairly cited Mr. Justice Brandeis because it appears that
the Trade Commission has been largely relieved of showing "the ap-
prehended effect" that it hopes to head off when addressing a method
of doing business.
A 1919 Commission report said,
Previous -to . .. creation of the Commission, the courts had
ruled upon various forms of unfair practices. Their decisions
are designated as cases arising under the common law. But
121. FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920).
122. Id. at 427 (emphasis added).
123. Id. at 428.
124. 384 U.S. at 322.
125. 253 U.S. at 441-42 (emphasis added).
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upon the creation of the Commission, it was empowered to leave
the shores defined by the common law and, taking the knowledge
of these decisions with it, to embark on an uncharted sea, using
common sense plus the common law for its compass.1
2 6
While Gratz overemphasized the common law and de-emphasized
common sense, Brown Shoe represents quite another, but not recip-
rocal, extreme of the pendulum swing.
3. "Unfairness" Defined by "Public Values."-The pendulum
swung still further after Brown Shoe I. The Supreme Court's Sperry
& Hutchinson (S&H)'2 decision in 1972 established that in the
realm of trade restraints, FTC's role is triggered by "public values
beyond simply those enshrined in the letter or encompassed in the
spirit of the antitrust laws.'
' 2s
As one of its marketing techniques, S&H retained physical own-
ership of the trading stamps it sold retailers for their subsequent
delivery to consumers as a premium for patronage. S&H's purpose
was to minimize commercial trading in S&H stamps, lest such
traffic reduce attractiveness of S&H stamps to customer-retailers.
Frequent enlistment of courts' injunctive powers against unauthor-
ized handling of S&H stamps, and threats of such action, lent
credence to the position.
29
An FTC examiner dismissed charges brought against S&H under
section 5 of the FTC Act."10  The Commission reversed, finding an
"impairment of competition,""' 1 and issued an order that, inter alia,
barred interference with unauthorized stamp dealing, including suits
to enjoin this traffic. Central to the Commission's opinion was a
holding that S&H "prevents . . . competitive reaction[s] and thereby
it has restrained trade. We believe this to be an unfair method of
competition and an unfair act and practice in violation of Section 5 of
the FTC Act. 1" 2  The Fifth Circuit vacated the portions of the
Commission's order enjoining prevention of unauthorized traffic in
S&H stamps:
Congress could not have intended to vest the Commission with
such broad discretion as to allow it to label a restraint 'unfair'
without applying some judicial guidelines. . . . To be the type
126. FTC ANN. REP. 45 (1919).
127. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
128. Id. at 244.
129. Id. at 238.
130. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. FTC, 432 F.2d 146, 147 (5th Cir. 1970).
131. 405 U.S. at 247.
132. Id. (emphasis added).
213
of practice that . . . [is] . . . 'unfair' the act . . . must . . .
[be]: (1) a per se violation of antitrust policy; (2) a viola-
tion of the letter of either the Sherman, Clayton, or Robinson-
Patman Acts; (3) a violation of the spirit of these Acts as rec-
ognized by the Supreme Court .... 13
From this Judge Wisdom dissented, saying that the majority's view
"blesses unfair anti-competitive practices against" trading stamp deal-
ers, retailers who accept or trade S&H stamps without its authority,
and consumers, thus failing "to give effect to the broad authority
Congress granted to. .. FTC.'
13 4
The Commission's petition for certiorari asked for a ruling as to
"[w]hether Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act . . . is
limited to conduct which violates the letter or spirit of the antitrust
laws."'135  The Court answered in the negative:
When Congress created the Federal Trade Commission in 1914
and charted its power and responsibility under § 5, it explicitly
considered, and rejected, the notion that it reduce the ambiguity
of the phrase 'unfair methods of competition' by tying the con-
cept of unfairness to a common-law or statutory standard or by
enumerating the particular practices to which it was intended to
apply.136
The Court concluded that FTC
does not arrogate excessive power to itself if, in measuring a
practice against ,the elusive, but congressionally mandated stand-
ard of fairness, it, like a court of equity, considers public values
beyond simply those enshrined in the letter or encompassed in
the spirit of the antitrust laws.'
3 7
The Court ruled that FTC's power is not limited to prohibit-
ing conduct that violates the letter or spirit of the antitrust laws, but
that FTC may attack any unfair practice, using "public values" to
define what is "unfair." Unfortunately, the Court failed to explain
what it meant by "public values" unless explication is satisfied by
pointing, via a footnote, 1 8 to the Commission's explicit predicates for
a rule concerning cigarette advertising. Therein FTC enumerated
bench marks for recognizing an unfair practice that neither violates
the antitrust laws nor is deceptive:
(1) [W]hether the practice, without necessarily having been
previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has
been established by statutes, the common law or otherwise-
whether, in other words, it is within the penumbra of some com-
mon-law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness;
(2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupu-
133. 432 F.2d at 150 (emphasis added).
134. Id. at 155.
135. 405 U.S. at 239.
136. Id. at 239-40.
137. Id. at 244.
138. Id. at 244-45 n.5.
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lous; (3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers (or
competitors or other businessmen).,39
The FTC must consider
whether the challenged practices, though posing no threat to
competition within the precepts of the antitrust laws, are never-
theless either (1) unfair methods of competition or (2) unfair
or deceptive acts or practices.
140
This standard notifies practitioners that there are "unfair methods of
competition" that pose "no threat to competition." It seems to
equate such "unfair methods" with "unfair practices." This conclu-
sion is aided by the Court's seemingly approving reference to the
Commission's penumbral bench marks. This gives rise to the doubt
expressed earlier that there remains any necessary difference between
"unfair methods of competition" and "unfair practices."''
Defining the nebulous "unfairness" standard is a difficult task.
That which is within the "penumbra" of common-law, statutory or
some other established concept of unfairness resists analysis. It
would seem, at the least, to incorporate every statute that deals with
unfairness. Perhaps meaning can be supplied by reference to the
1934 Keppel decision'42 upon which the 1972 Court heavily relied.
Therein, it was suggested that conduct that receives "condemnation
throughout the community" or is "of the sort which the common
law and criminal statutes have long deemed contrary to public policy"
is "unfair."' 43
In any event, the courts are now on notice that the Commission's
case-to-case recognition of unfair practices is not to be lightly put
aside. A saving grace is that remand was directed for the Commis-
sion to determine, and explain, whether there had been injury to
competitors or consumers.144  Arguably, this feature could become
quite meaningful in that it strikes at agencies' ritualistic recital of
holdings within their enabling statutes.
B. "Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices"
Looking to the pre-S&H role of "unfair or deceptive acts or
practices," the Commission has a long track record of dealing with
139. Id. (emphasis added).
140. Id. at 245 (emphasis added).
141. See note 60 and accompanying text supra.
142. FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bro., 291 U.S. 304 (1934).
143. Id. at 313.
144. 405 U.S. at 247-50.
questionable promotions aimed at consumers and competitors. Tar-
gets have included the following: trading on the gambling instinct; 145
false disparagement of a competitor's product;146 inducing potential
customers' breach of contracts with seller's competitor;14T advertising
claims in excess of product capacity; 148 and fictitious pricing.1 49
Recently the Commission has taken the position that a marketer's
failure to possess proof supporting a reasonable basis for affirmative
product claims is itself an unfair practice.'5 " Thus, false repre-
sentations are not a sine qua non to consumer deception and such
deception may arise from a failure to make adequate disclosures. 5'
Beneficiaries of FTC consumer protection vigilance include "the
unthinking and credulous. . . as well as the more sophisticated and
intelligent.' 52  Focusing on consumer deception, a tendency or ca-
pacity to mislead will suffice for the requisite "unfairness"'' 5 and
absence of intent to mislead is not a defense.1
54
Proceeding by analogy to statutes other than the FTC Act is not
peculiar to FTC antitrust, but also surfaces in FTC's consumer
protection role. Thus, when it enjoyed the lead role under the Flam-
mable Fabrics Act,' FTC proceeded against a distributor of a lei
composed of wood chips on the theory that distribution of the flam-
mable product was unfair under section 5 of the FTC Act. 5 '
In summary, FTC power over marketing practices is extraordi-
narily broad. Under the 1975 Act, FTC power is particularly rele-
vant to jurisdictions lacking aggressive consumer protection
schemes.1
57
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Confinement to a local practice will no longer excuse unaware-
ness of FTC activity and trends. While the outer limits of FTC
power are not discernible save by reference to what will ultimately
shock courts, there is a substantial body of precedent on practices
"in commerce" that have been deemed unfair. They will serve as a
beginning index for assessing commercial conduct "affecting com-
merce" and must be considered.
The Commission is prolific about announcing triumphs and
initiatives. Much "lunch-time law" is available from Commissioners'
speeches, as well as those of staff members, which are available on re-
quest from FTC and at least alluded to in various commercial publica-
tions. Previously unmentioned are Commission-published guide-
lines on interpretation of the various statutes within its everyday
sphere. These speeches and guidelines are invaluable, albeit not
all-revealing, for gauging the direction of future enforcement. Coun-
sel to local trade associations and substantial, intrastate enterprises
will do well to watch the Federal Register carefully against the day
that applicable trade regulation rules are proposed. This is partic-
ularly true if one entertains a bias toward or against "friendly com-
petition."
Not every or even many FTC initiatives can be expected to raise
issues significant enough to merit contest unto the Supreme Court.
Much of what will be done will not be shocking. The stage is set,
however, for arbitrary determinations that must be guarded against.
On the other hand, counsel need not await FTC action to begin
educating clients about the inadvisability of continuing previously
untouched (if not untouchable) practices, such as uniform warranty
policies. There is time for homework.
